Alaska Distress Law in the Commercial Context: Ancient Relic of Functional Remedy by Osowski, Shane J.
Alaska Distress Law in the
Commercial Context:
Ancient Relic or Functional Remedy?
SHANE J. OSOWSKI*
I. INTRODUCTION
At early common law, when a tenant's rent became overdue,
the landlord simply showed up at the door, seized any property on
the leased premises, and held this property until the rent was paid.
Courts viewed this right to distress' as an in rem remedy for past-
due rent against property situated on the leased premises. The
landlord's right was absolute; distress was proper even if the
distrained property did not belong to the delinquent tenant.2
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1. See 52 CJ.S. Landlord & Tenant §§ 674, 680 (1968). Distress is "[t]he
taking of goods and chattels out of the possession of a wrong-doer into the custody
of the party injured to procure a satisfaction for a wrong committed; as for non-
payment of rent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (6th ed. 1990). Distraint is "the
act of distraining or making a distress," and is often used as a synonym. Id. Some
courts have attempted to distinguish between these two terms. See, e.g., Davis v.
Odell, 729 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Kan. 1986) ("Distraint" is any seizure of personalty to
enforce a lien, while "distress" specifically refers to landlord distraint for past due
rent.). This article, however, will treat the two terms as equivalent.
2. See, e.g., Allan W. Rhynhart, Distress, 3 MD. L. REv. 185, 185 (1953)
("goods of a stranger are liable to distress with those of the tenant"); 52 C.J.S.
Landlord & Tenant § 681 (1968) (property of third persons subject to distress). The
third party who owned the distrained property could bring an action against the
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Consistent with the trend toward consumer protection and away
from self-help, modem property law has limited the distress
remedy.' Commentators have characterized distress as "a surviving
feudal prerogative, adopted when no rights amounted to much of
anything except those of the owner of land, and when personal
property was not so much prized as at present."4 Some jurisdictions
still recognize the common law distress remedy or have statutory
provisions permitting distress.' This article will analyze whether
and to what extent the concept of landlord distress in the commer-
cial context exists under Alaska common law.'
tenant for damages. DAVID S. HILL, LANDLORD AND TENANT LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 288 (2d ed. 1986).
3. See Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Special Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial
Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37 VAND. L.
REV. 845, 937, 1040 (1984) [hereinafter Self-Help] (arguing that self-help still has
a beneficial purpose, but trend has been to shift remedies from landlords to
tenants).
4. Annotation, Goods Owned by Stranger or Subject to an Encumbrance in His
Favor As Subject to Distraint for Rent, 62 A.L.R. 1106, 1107 (1929) [hereinafter
Goods Owned by Stranger]; see also Van Ness Indus., Inc. v. Claremont Painting
& Decorating Co., 324 A.2d 102, 104 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) (Distress
procedure arose "'out of the early feudal conception of self-help, and stands as the
sole surviving relic in modem statutory law of the absolutism incident to the ancient
feudal doctrine governing land tenures."' (quoting Commercial Credit Co. v. Vineis,
120 A. 417, 418 (N.J. 1923))); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, 2 FRIEDMAN ON LEASES
§ 20.1 (3d ed. 1990) (Distress is a "crude, quick, and drastic" remedy.); EMANUEL
B. HALPER, SHOPPING CENTER AND STORE LEASES § 16.11 (rev. ed. 1991)
(Distress is a "vestige of the landlord-tenant law of another era.").
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note 5 (1977)
(listing 16 jurisdictions giving the landlord a statutory remedy similar to common
law distress, 29 jurisdictions providing the landlord a lien on the tenant's property,
10 jurisdictions at least partially abolishing distress and 16 jurisdictions lacking any
statutory provision). It should be noted that the Restatement incorrectly lists
Alaska among the states that have completely abolished distress. Compare id.
(stating "distress abolished" as opposed to "distress abolished for residential
leases") with ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250 (1990) (provision of adopted Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act which the Restatement relies upon). For a
detailed discussion of the continued validity of distress in Alaska, see infra text
accompanying notes 147-165.
6. Alaska has no statutory provision allowing distraint. To the extent that
other states codify the common law distress remedy, such statutes either follow the
common law verbatim or reflect desired reforms in the common law. For a general
overview of statutory landlord liens, see 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 675(1970).
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Part II of this article examines the origin of distress as it existed
at common law. Part III discusses possible priority conflicts
between the distraining landlord and other interested parties. The
constitutional implications of distress in light of modem due process
requirements are explored in part IV. Part V considers whether
distress in the commercial context remains a viable legal remedy in
Alaska after recent reforms and the adoption of the Uniform
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act.7 Assuming an affirmative
answer to that question, part VI explores what procedures govern
distraint in Alaska.
This article concludes that distress remains a desirable compo-
nent of commercial landlord-tenant law in Alaska. Because this
conclusion rests on the premise that parties to a commercial lease
are arms-length bargainers, common law priority rules should apply
only to the parties to the lease. The common law priority rules
must therefore be modified to leave the rights of non-bargaining
third party creditors unimpaired. Distress would then be available
solely between a landlord and a commercial tenant, and only to the
extent that non-consenting third parties are not harmed. This article
provides a suggested course of action for both landlords and tenants
to follow until either the Alaska Supreme Court or the Alaska
Legislature provides clearer guidelines.
II. THE ORIGIN OF DISTRAiNT
To protect landlords from defaulting tenants who withdrew and
concealed their effects, the law of distraint "'allow[ed] a man to be
his own avenger."'" The law permitted the landlord to go on the
leased premises and take any chattel found there as security for
overdue rent.' As a general rule, all movables were susceptible to
a distraint lien whether they actually belonged to the tenant or to
a stranger.0
7. UNiF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr 7B U.L.A. 427 (1985).
Alaska substantially adopted the major provisions of this Act in 1974. Id.; see also
1974 Alaska Sess. Laws 10 (codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-
.380 (1990 & Supp. 1992)).
8. Smith v. Chipman, 348 P.2d 441, 442 (Or. 1960) (quoting 3-4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS *1024).
9. See 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 726 (1970); 52 C.J.S. Landlord
& Tenant § 674 (1968).
10. 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 726 (1970); see also Goods Owned
by Stranger, supra note 4, at 1109 (reasoning that "otherwise a door would be open
to infinite frauds upon the landlord; and the stranger has his remedy over by action
on the case against the tenant").
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Property privileged under exceptions to this rule included goods
in custodia legis,' goods in actual use by the tenant and tools and
utensils of the tenant's trade. 2 These exclusions served the public
interest by maintaining orderly legal processes and allowing the
tenant to continue a trade that contributed to the commonwealth.13
Other exceptions existed for goods belonging to a third party that
were merely on the premises for manufacture, sale or repair. 4
Finally, property that was not returnable in the condition in which
it was taken was also exempt from distress.1 Any goods which did
not fall under one of these categories were subject to distress if
certain conditions were met.
A. Conditions for Distress
The initial requirement for distress was the existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship.16  At early common law, once a
landlord terminated a lease, he waived any right to distrain the
tenant's property. 7  However, the eighteenth century English
Statute of 8 Anne, ch. 14, extended the right to distrain for six
months beyond the termination of the lease.'8 This statute has
been incorporated into the common law or adopted by statute in
11. "In custodia legis" means "in the custody or keeping of the law," and would
apply to chattels that had already been executed upon. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY
768 (6th ed. 1990). While goods of a bankrupt tenant, after bankruptcy has been
filed, are in custodia legis, goods of an insolvent tenant in the possession of an
assignee for the benefit of creditors are not. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and
Tenant § 745 (1970).
12. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord & Tenant §§ 742-43 (1970).
13. See Smith v. Chipman, 348 P.2d 441, 443 (Or. 1960) (citing 3-4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *1024).
14. See Goods Owned by Stranger, supra note 4, at 1119-25.
15. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 743-44 (1970). The requirement
that goods be returnable in the same condition originally existed because the
landlord had no power of sale and could hold the goods only until the tenant paid
rent. One example is perishable goods, which were not subject to distraint. See
Rhynhart, supra note 2, at 194-95 (suggesting the advent of refrigeration may have
eliminated many prior exemptions).
16. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 731 (1970).
17. Id. § 756.
18. Id.
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several states. 9 Nevertheless, a distraining landlord would be wise
to exercise this right during the tenancy.?
Another prerequisite for distress was the existence of overdue
rent.2' At common law, actual overdue rent payments were the
only claim that would support distress; this remedy did not exist for
utilities, damages, penalties or interest.' A lease can be drafted,
however, to place items such as utilities under the category of rent
in order to expand the breadth of the distress remedy.
Acceleration clauses24 can make it difficult to determine when
rent becomes overdue. Such clauses were unenforceable at common
laws and some courts still refuse to allow distress for any future
unearned rent.? Other courts have allowed the remedy under
acceleration clauses if the lease clearly states that all rent becomes
due on the date the lease begins and that the tenant, from that point
forward, is merely a creditor of the landlord.'
19. Id. See, e.g., In re Great Basin Holding Corp., 9 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1981) (ancient statute, in predating the Declaration of American Indepen-
dence, became part of Nevada's common law); Self-Help, supra note 3, at 939
(referring to "common law" restriction that landlords must distrain within six
months after lease termination).
20. Cf Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 124 (Alaska 1991)
(landlord accepting tenant's offer of surrender and retaking possession may
terminate lease and relieve tenant of duty to pay rent).
21. 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant §§ 732-35 (1970).
22. Id. § 372.
23. Compare Elmira Corp. v. Bulman, 135 A.2d 645,649 (D.C. 1957) (Statutory
lien for "rent" does not include water charges "unless the clear intention of the
parties is shown in the [lease] to make this a part of the consideration.") with
Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Bild, 104 N.E.2d 666, 667 (I1. App. Ct. 1952) (excess
electricity part of "rent"); see generally Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation,
Landlord's Remedy by Way of Distress or Lien on Defaulting Tenant's Property on
Leased Premises as Including Right to Collect for All Unpaid Utility Expenses, 99
A.L.R. 3d 1100 (1980).
24. An acceleration clause is a provision of a credit agreement that requires the
obligor "to pay part or all of the balance sooner than the date or dates specified for
payment upon the occurrence of some event or circumstance described in the
contract." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 12 (6th ed. 1990).
25. See Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337, 341-42 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 966 (1968).
26. See, e.g., id.; Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., 7 S.E.2d 63, 66-67 (S.C. 1940).
27. See, e.g, American Seating Co. v. Murdock, 169 A. 250 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1933); Francis H. Legget & Co. v. Orangeburg Piggly Wiggly Co., 180 S.E. 483 (S.C.
1935); but see Brunswick Corp., 392 F.2d at 341 (finding that landlord waived right
to distrain for total amount of lease through prior acts which were inconsistent with
theory that total amount of rent was due at beginning of term).
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The final condition to actuate the landlord's distress remedy
was the seizure of personal property found on the demised premises.
Distraint provided the landlord with a specific possessory lien which
had no effect until some type of seizure occurred.' Before such
a seizure occurred, the landlord had no true lien, but only an
inchoate right which was in the nature of a lien.29 Until this right
was exercised, it did not in any way encumber the tenant's prop-
erty.
30
B. Common Law Distress Procedures and Consequences
At common law, the landlord could personally levy, or seize,
the tenant's property or appoint an agent to do so.31 Through the
use of a warrant, authorized by the court, a bailiff often was
designated by the landlord to act as his agent.32 This warrant
entitled the landlord to the distress remedy and created an implied
obligation on his part to indemnify the bailiff if the distress was
improper.3
The bailiff or the landlord then entered the leasehold and either
impounded the chattels or declared and posted notice of the distress.
This entry had to be made during the day and without force.'
28. See RESTATEMENT OF SECUR1TY ch. 2, scope note (1941); see also
MICHAEL BARNES, HILL AND REDMAN'S LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 402-
03 (16th ed. 1976) (actual or constructive seizure sufficient; constructive seizure
sufficient if landlord interferes to prevent removal of chattel); Rhynhart, supra note
2, at 198 (seizure required, "but slight acts, such as walking around the premises
and making an inventory of the goods, and declaring them to be seized are suffi-
cient").
29. See Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631, 638 (1912) ("Before the distraint,
the landlord at common law has 'no lien on any particular portion of the goods, and
is only an ordinary creditor, except that he has the right of distress by reason of
which he may place himself in a better position."' (quoting Sutton v. Rees, 9 Jur.
(N.S.) 456 (1863))); see generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 726
(1970).
30. See 52 CJ.S. Landlord & Tenant §§ 605, 674 (1968).
31. See BARNES, supra note 28, at 397; 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 689(b)
(1968).
32. 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 689(b) (1968). The bailiff's role will be
briefly discussed, as this author concludes that use of a bailiff violates the United
States Constitution.
33. See BARNES, supra note 28, at 398.
34. See id. at 383-84 (distress only in daytime); id. at 400 ("legal and peaceful
fashion"). However, if upon entering, the distrainor was forcibly expelled or driven
away by the tenant's violence, the distrainor could re-enter by force with the
assistance of a peace officer. Id. at 401.
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Seized items were originally deposited in a public pound where they
were securely held until the tenant paid the overdue rent. The
Distress for Rent Act of 1737 permitted impounding on the
premises, however, 5 and public pounds have practically disap-
peared.36
While distress initially provided no power of sale to the
landlord, "the Sale of Distress Act of 1689... extended the law...
by authorizing the sale of distrained property in satisfaction of the
claim for rent."'37 In order to allow the tenant time to replevy, this
sale could not take place until five days after the seizure."
III. DISTRAiNT PRIORiTY
The procedure by which the landlord distrained at common law
became more complicated when other parties were involved. At
early common law, the distraining landlord possessed a super-
priority over all other creditors and claimants.39 The landlord's
priority sprang not from placing "first in a race of diligence, but
[rather was] given by law because of the nature of the claim and the
relation between [landlord and tenant]."'  Even outright owner-
ship of property by a person other than the tenant could not defeat
the landlord's claim.4' Modern property law, however, allows these
common law priority rights to be modified by contract, bankruptcy
or federal and state policy concerns.
35. Id. at 405-06 n.d.; see also 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 694 (1968).
36. BARNES, supra note 28, at 405 n.a.
37. Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762, 763 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
38. See BARNES, supra note 28, at 421. "Replevy" refers to the action of
replevin, which allows the owner of chattels wrongfully distrained to recover them.
See BLACK's LAw DICrloNARY 1299, 1300 (6th ed. 1990).
39. See Henderson v. Mayer, 225 U.S. 631, 639 (1912).
40. Id.
41. 52 CJ.S. Landlord & Tenant § 681(b)(1) (1968) (Mortgaged property left
in a tenant's possession is subject to distraint under the general rule allowing
distress against the property of a third person.); see supra notes 1-2 and accom-
panying text.
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A. Article Nine Coverage
1. Consensual Landlord Liens. A landlord may bargain with
a commercial tenant to include in the lease a contractual lien
provision providing for some form of distress. The Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC") expressly governs "all consensual
security interests,"'42 including contractual liens.43 A landlord
desiring priority under a contractual lien must therefore file as a
normal UCC creditor. Priority is then controlled by Article Nine's
"first to fie" rule, with the exception of purchase money lenders.44
2. Non-consensual Landlord Liens. A landlord may also secure
a lien on a tenant's property through operation of the common law
of distraint. Such liens are non-consensual and are therefore not
covered by the UCC.45 Rather, priority is established by the
landlord-tenant relationship. Because no lien arises until the
landlord actually seizes the tenant's property, a landlord could never
win a UCC time-based priority battle. Basing priority solely on the
landlord-tenant relationship, therefore, gives life to the distress
remedy. While most jurisdictions have statutorily withdrawn some
of this power, they have done so "for the purpose of protecting
the owner of the goods, rather than on account of any special
privilege of the tenant."'47
3. Non-consensual Liens vs. UCC Security Interests. Courts
have used different approaches in deciding priorities between non-
42. U.C.C. § 9-102 (1990) (official comment).
43. See, e.g., In re Leckie Freeburn Coal Co., 405 F.2d 1043, 1047 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, Foster v. Hamblin, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-7 (3d ed. 1988) (Article Nine is
not applicable to liens authorized by statute or case law, but does apply to liens
authorized by contract.).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.312 (Supp. 1992); U.C.C. § 9-312 (1987).
45. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1990) (official comment). In fact, non-consensual
landlord liens are specifically excluded. Id. § 9-104(b) (1990). Alaska adopted this
exclusion verbatim. ALASKA STAT. § 45.09.104(2) (1986). An in-depth analysis of
all possible approaches used when deciding priority between landlord liens and
UCC liens is beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive analysis of this
topic, see Gregory B. Wilcox & Frank B. Harty, The Relative Priority of a
Landlord's Lien and Article 9 Security Interest, 35 DRAKE L. REv. 27 (1985-86).
46. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 748 ("[E]xceptions will, in the
end, eat out the common-law rule."); see generally id. §§ 750-53 (discussing
statutory modifications).
47. Id. § 748.
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consensual distraint liens and consensual UCC security interests.
One moderate position distinguishes between purchase-money1s
and blanket security interests. Under this priority rule, a properly
filed purchase money security interest will prevail over the land-
lord's distress remedy, while a blanket security interest will not.49
Another position is to determine priority based upon when tenancy
begins and when property is brought onto the demised premises.5
Finally, the greatest change from the common law has been to apply
the general "first in time" priority rule." Using "first in time,"
landlords generally lose, as their possessory lien does not come into
existence until after distraint. However, "first in time" arguably
creates the most equitable results for all concerned. 2
B. Bankruptcy
As one federal district court has commented, "[t]he position of
the landlord as a claimant in bankruptcy has steadily worsened since
the inception of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898."' Despite landlords'
"super-priority," the present Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid the fixing of any statutory or common law lien
"for rent" or "distress for rent."' This avoidance power has no
48. A "purchase money security interest" is a "secured interest which is created
when a buyer uses the money of the lender to make the purchase and immediately
gives to the lender a security interest." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1357 (6th ed.
1990).
49. See, e.g., Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Congressional Motors, Inc., 228
A.2d 463, 467 (Md. 1967) (under common law, conditional contracts of sale
exempted property from distress, but UCC blanket security interest loses to
landlord); Perkins v. Farmers Trust & Savings Bank, 421 N.W.2d 533,535-36 (Iowa
1988) (purchase money security interest "primed" landlord's lien, but non-purchase
money claim did not). "Prime" means "[t]o stand first or paramount; to take
precedence or priority of; to outrank." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1191 (6th ed.
1990).
50. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337,340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 966 (1968); 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant § 717 (1970).
51. See First State Bank v. De Kalb Bank, 530 N.E.2d 544,548 (II1. App. 1988)
(landlord lien given no special priority in derogation of general principle of "first
in time, first in right").
52. See infra part VII (arguing that landlords should be forced to bargain with
creditors, limiting common law distraint to tenant equity in property).
53. Thomas v. Gulfway Shopping Ctr., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D. Tex.
1970).
54. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1979 & Supp. 1992) (trustee has power to avoid
statutory lien); id § 101(53) (defines "statutory lien" to include "lien of distress for
rent, whether or not statutory"); see also In re Allegheny Nursing Serv., Inc., 17
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time limitation and applies even if the lien has been enforced by
sale before the bankruptcy commences.55 Thus, landlords are
stripped of any preferred priority if the tenant files bankruptcy.
This avoidance power appears to be inapplicable to contractual
landlord liens, however. The landlord can therefore avoid the
status of an unsecured creditor by following UCC requirements.
C. Federal Liens
The federal government may obtain a lien against a tenant in
various ways, most commonly through non-payment of taxes,
although guaranteed loans and mortgages may give rise to liens as
well. The Internal Revenue Code provides a specific lien attaching
to all property of any delinquent taxpayer.5 This lien will not take
priority over other security interests or lien creditors until notice has
been filed.5' However, courts have not treated landlords graciously
where the federal purse is at stake.
The leading case in this area is United States v. Scovil,59
which addressed the priority between a federal tax lien and a
landlord who had distrained under a South Carolina statute. The
statute allowed the tenant five days in which to put up a bond and
retrieve the distrained property before sale occurred.' During this
five-day period, the Collector of Internal Revenue filed notice of a
lien assessment." The Court held that, although distraint occurred
before the notice, the claim thus generated "was not perfected in the
federal sense at the time the Government's liens were ffled."'62
Because the tenant still could redeem its property, the landlord's
"lien was only a caveat of a more perfect lien to come."'63 There-
fore, the ta- lien had priority over the landlord's distraint.
B.R. 594, 597 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 545).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1979 & Supp. 1992).
56. See Thomas, 320 F. Supp. at 767 (Bankruptcy Act does not invalidate
contractual liens.); In re Furniture Discount Stores, Inc., 11 B.R. 5, 7 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1980) (statutory and common law lien avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 545; while
the court recognized existence of a contractual lien, landlord's failure to file was
fatal to that claim).
57. I.R.C. § 6321 (1991). This lien generally arises when tax assessment is
made. Id. § 6322. The lien also is subject to special priority provisions. Id. § 6323.
58. Id. § 6323(a).
59. 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 220.
63. Id.
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Cases since Scovil have expanded and clarified this "perfected
in the federal sense" concept. Where a federal lien is disputed,
courts may even ignore state law governing perfection and apply
federal common law. An example of this is Stein v. Moot,Y in
which the Small Business Administration ("SBA") had asserted a
chattel mortgage against a commercial tenant's property. Under
Delaware state law, landlords held perfected liens on tenants'
property located on the landlords' premises for up to one year's
overdue rent. These liens were paramount to any chattel mortgages.
Even in the absence of any conflicting federal statute, the court held
that "'federal common law is determinative where the question
involved is the priority to be accorded to a lien of the federal
government whatever its source."'65 Stein decided the priority issue
using the federal rule of "first in time, first in right."66 Because the
landlord had not distrained before the SBA lien attached, the
government prevailed.67
In order to compete with a federal lien, a state lien must be
"choate" 6 under federal law.69 This means that it must be "specif-
ic to the point that nothing further need be done to make the lien
enforceable."7 To meet this specificity requirement, the landlord
must establish that: (1) the asset subject to the lien is specifically
ascertained; (2) the lienor is identified; and (3) the amount of the
encumbrance is certain.71
D. State Liens
Alaska statutes provide a host of statutory liens with varying
priorities, including liens for mechanics and materialmen; mines and
64. 297 F. Supp. 708 (D. Del. 1969).
65. Id. at 711 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Oswald and Hess Co.,
345 F.2d 886, 887 (3d Cir. 1965)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. "Choate" refers to a lien which "has become perfected or ripened."
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 505-07 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
United States v. Globe Corp., 546 P.2d 11,16 (Ariz. 1976) (statutory lien perfected
under state law held inchoate under federal law and subordinate to tax lien).
70. Trustees of the Clients' Security Fund v. Yucht, 578 A.2d 900, 904 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989) (citing United States v. Bond, 279 F.2d 837 (4th Cir.
1960)).
71. Id. (citing Illinois ex. reL Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946)). The
landlord carries the burden of showing that his distraint lien meets these
requirements. Id.
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wells; improvement of chattels; transportation, storage and agist-
ment;72 timber and lumber; fish packers and processors; fishermen;
watchmen; attorneys; wages; hospitals and nurses; and hotels and
boardinghouses.73 Many of these liens are granted special priori-
ties, including a likely priority over a landlord's common law
distraint lien.74 These priorities evidence Alaska's public policy
determination to protect the enumerated interests.
Alaska law also provides for liens to collect taxes and contribu-
tions for workers' compensation.75 These likewise would have
priority over any landlord distraint claims, as they are expressly
given priority over "all other liens or claims except [prior tax
liens]."'
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
A. Debtor Protectionism
In recent years, many self-help measures have come under
constitutional attack as a violation of due process.' The Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution and article I,
section 7 of the Alaska Constitution may require notice and an
opportunity to be heard before seizure of a debtor's or tenant's
72. "Agistment" refers to "[a] contract whereby a person, called an agister, has
control of animals and retains possession of land." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 66
(6th ed. 1990). An "agister" is "[a] person engaged in the business of pasturing of
cattle as a bailee in consideration of an agreed price to be paid by [the] owner of
cattle." Id.
73. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.35.050-.530 (1990).
74. See Great Western Sav. Bank v. George W. Easley Co., 778 P.2d 569, 576-
77 (Alaska 1989) (Express statutory lien priority evidences legislative intent to
provide a complete and prioritized system of remedies that preempts other
remedies in situations specifically addressed by the particular statute.).
75. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.250 (1990) (workers' compensation contribu-
tions); id § 29.4.5.310 (provides distraint and sale of personal property for municipal
tax deficiency); id § 43.10.030 ("The remedy of distraint on property [as statutorily
specified] applies to all state revenue statutes existing or hereafter enacted for the
collection of taxes and license fees.").
76. Id § 23.20.250(a); id. § 29.45.300(b) (1992) (A property tax "lien is prior
and paramount to all other liens or encumbrances against the property."); see also
id. § 43.10.042(a) (1990) (certain statutory liens "superior to all other liens.., upon
... real and personal property").
77. See generally Self-Help, supra note 3 (analysis of various self-help remedies
in modem society).
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property.8 The United States Supreme Court made this clear in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., where it invalidated a prejudg-
ment wage garnishment procedure.80 The Court recognized that
such a procedure could meet due process requirements "in extraor-
dinary situations," but concluded that the creditor's interest in
payment in the instant case did not constitute such a situation.8'
Sniadach found wages to be a "specialized type of property."'
Because a tremendous hardship would be imposed on wage earners
deprived of such resources, ' the Court determined that the
procedure violated fundamental principles of due process. 4
Three years later, Fuentes v. Shevin85 clarified the scope of the
Sniadach holding. Fuentes rejected any distinction based on
deprivations that were "temporary"'  or non-necessities, stating
that Sniadach had "nothing to do with absolute 'necessities' of
life."'  Rather, the Court claimed that Sniadach simply established
"that due process requires an opportunity for a hearing before
deprivation of property takes effect."'o
The appellants in Fuentes challenged the constitutionality of
statutes allowing the seizure of goods under state-issued writs of
replevin89 without notice or a prior hearing.' Under the chal-
lenged statutes, seizure could occur once a creditor filed an
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7. The Alaska
Supreme Court has applied identical analysis and reasoning when deciding due
process claims under either clause. Therefore, state decisions will not be separately
addressed. See Etheredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1972) (no state-federal
distinction made when considering due process claim).
79. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
80. ML at 342.
81. AL at 339.
82. Id. at 340.
83. Id
84. Id. at 342.
85. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
86. Id. at 84-85.
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id.
89. The Court noted that the replevin action descended from common law and
was typically used after a landlord had wrongfully distrained goods. Id. at 78. At
common law, creditors were not entitled to utilize replevin. Id. at 79 ("[I]f a
creditor wished to invoke state power to recover goods wrongfully detained, he had
to proceed through the action of debt or detinue."). Creditors could, however,
"proceed without the use of state power, through self-help, by 'distraining' the
property before a judgment." Id. at 79 n.12.
90. Id. at 69-70.
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application and posted a security bond.91 The property would be
taken at the same moment the defendant received the complaint,
with no opportunity to challenge the issuance of the writ until the
eventual hearing of the creditor's claim.'
The Court determined that the challenged statutes "[flew] in the
face" of the right to procedural due process. 3  "If the right to
notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose," the Court
reasoned, "it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can
still be prevented."'  A hearing occurring after seizure is insuffi-
cient, for a "'wrong may [not] be done [just because] it can be
undone."'95 The Court noted that the application procedure under
the challenged statutes did deter "wholly unfounded" claims, but
nevertheless found the procedure to be an inadequate substitute for
a prior hearing because it "test[s] no more than the strength of the
applicant's own belief in his rights."'  Where private gain is at
stake, the Court reasoned, creditors are likely to have misplaced
confidence that they ultimately will prevail at trial, and courts
cannot normally take even tentative action before hearing both
sides. 7
B. State Action
Because self-help occurs without notice or a prior hearing, it
would appear to be a dying remedy after Sniadach and Fuentes. The
Supreme Court, however, may have resuscitated self-help in Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks.9" Recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment
only protects against state deprivation of property without due
process, Flagg Bros. held that a warehouseman's private sale to
enforce his UCC lien was not within the purview of this amend-
ment.99
In order to violate constitutional protections, property depriva-
tion must occur under color of a statute and be properly attributable
to the state.lC" In characterizing the New York law which allowed
property deprivation to occur as "mere acquiescence in a private
91. Id.
92. Id at 75.
93. Id at 83.
94. Ide at 81.
95. See id at 82 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972)).
96. Id at 83.
97. Id
98. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
99. Id at 153.
100. Id at 156.
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action,"' ' the Court stated that New York had "done nothing
more than authorize ... - without participation by any public
official - what Flagg Brothers would tend to do, even in the
absence of such authorization, i.e., dispose of [the] property."' °2
In the Court's view, such passive conduct did not amount to
state action. The Court emphasized that: (1) settlement of debtor-
creditor disputes is not traditionally an exclusive public function; (2)
the plaintiff never alleged that state law prevented bailors, at the
time of storing goods, from seeking a waiver of the warehouseman's
right to sell; and (3) that, presumably, aggrieved bailors could
pursue other remedies for damages or replevin." 3 Therefore,
according to the Court, the actions responsible for deprivation of the
bailor's property were not attributable to the State of New York.
The Court concluded:
Here, the State of New York has not compelled the sale of a
bailor's goods, but has merely announced the circumstances
under which its courts will not interfere with a private sale.
Indeed, the crux of respondents' complaint is not that the State
has acted, but that it has refused to act." 4
The question left unanswered then is whether a landlord's
distraint constitutes private action or state action. While the
Supreme Court has not addressed this precise issue, it has provided
additional clarification of the "state-action" and action "under-color-
of-state-law" confusion. In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,3 5 the
Court invalidated on due process grounds a Virginia prejudgment
attachment law that enabled a county sheriff to sequester a debtor's
property based solely upon a creditor's allegations." 6 The Lugar
Court observed that while "state action" and action "under-the-
color-of-state-law" are not always identical, when a state official is
alleged to have caused the deprivation of property, the two
principles "collapse into each other" and have equivalent mean-
ings." If the constitutional challenge is directed at a private
party, however, the two principles diverge and denote separate areas
of inquiry.'O In such a case, "something more" is required to
101. Id. at 164.
102. Id. at 162 n.12.
103. Id. at 160-61.
104. Id. at 165-66.
105. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
106. Id at 924-25.
107. Id. at 937.
108. Id.
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attribute the actions of the private party to the state.1' 9 The Court
characterized the process as a "fact-bound inquiry,' 10 but found
that where the attachment is carried out by state officials acting on
the ex parte application of one litigant in a private dispute, both
requirements are met.' Virginia's "joint participation," therefore,
constituted state deprivation of property without due process. 12
C. Appellate Courts
The federal courts of appeals are divided regarding the "state
action" status of landlord distraint. In Hall v. Garson,"' the Fifth
Circuit held that a Texas distraint statute constituted state action
and was subject to constitutional constraints. 4 The Third Circuit,
however, reached a distinguishable conclusion in Parks v. "Mr.
Ford.""'5 Although Parks was not a distraint case, it involved the
similar issue of whether a private sale to enforce a mechanic's lien
violated the Due Process Clause. The court held that although
retention of a vehicle under a common law repairman's lien was not
state action, subsequent sale to satisfy the lien was."6 Thus, the
court explained that the state statute, which authorized these sales
and directed how they should be carried out, had the effect of
rendering the sales judicial sales: "The statute not only extended the
power of sale to the garageman but also directed him to follow the
same procedures employed by a sheriff or constable.""17
In Davis v. Richmond,"' the First Circuit determined that
private distraint under Massachusetts law was not state action, even
though the statute made it illegal for the owner to remove belong-
ings that were subject to a valid distress lien." 9 In Davis, which
involved a boardinghouse keeper's lien, the court declined "to
109. Id at 939.
110. Id
111. Id at 942.
112. Id. at 940, 942.
113. 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
114. The court found state action to be present, even though the landlord acted
without state assistance. Id at 439-40. Hall's holding was based on a finding that
lien execution was traditionally a state function in Texas. Id.
115. 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977).
116. Id. at 141.
117. Id.
118. 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
119. Id. at 202 n.1.
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decide the issue of state involvement on the basis of whether a
particular class of creditor did or did not enjoy the same freedom to
act in Elizabethan or Georgian England."'" A focus on common
law origin, the court reasoned, would produce the anomalous result
of finding common law conduct in one state constitutional, while
prohibiting the identical statutorily sanctioned conduct in a
neighboring state.'2'
The court instead focused on "the impact of the law on private
ordering"'" and determined that the state was acting as a rule
maker rather than as a participant." According to the court, the
pro-landlord statute was merely one permissible alternative from a
range of possible rules to promulgate. 4 Davis also decided that
distress was not a delegated traditional public function because even
in a "state of nature" or organized society without a law on point,
assertion of this type of self-help was a reasonable expectation.12
5
Results similar to Davis were reached by the Seventh and Third
Circuits.1" The Third Circuit opinion in Luria Bros. & Co. v.
Allen 27 is particularly informative, as it was decided after the
Supreme Court decision in Flagg Bros." Luria Bros. applied the
two-part test of Flagg Bros. and held that because the state had not
participated in the distraint process, the actions could not be
attributable to the state.'29 In reaching this decision, the court
relied upon several factors: (1) as in Flagg Bros., no public officials
were named as defendants in the complaint; (2) the statute merely
permitted, but did not compel, creditor self-help; and (3) the private
arrangements in ordering commercial relationships are not tradition-
120. Id. at 203.
121. Id. at 204 (citing WILLIAM BURKE AND DAvI REBER, Congressional
Power and Creditor's Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1, 47 (1973)).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150 (7th
Cir. 1975) (statutory hotelkeeper's lien not state action), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928
(1976); Luria Bros. & Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982).
127. 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982).
128. See supra text accompanying note 98.
129. Luria Bros., 672 F.2d at 352, 354.
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ally exclusive government functions. 3° The court* explained that
commercial subtenants, like Luria, who fear "a landlord-tenant
squeeze play" can protect themselves by bargaining for a "no
distraint clause in [their] sublease.''
D. Ninth Circuit Analysis
The critical (and unresolved) question for Alaska is how the
Ninth Circuit will treat landlord distraint. The only case on point
is the pre-Flagg decision of Culbertson v. Leland,32 which involved
an Arizona innkeeper's lien statute that permitted distraint of
guests' possessions for accommodation charges. The court, while
recognizing that it was "squarely in conflict with the First Circuit"
holding in Davis, ruled that the state had significantly involved itself
in the dispute and consequently must comply with the Due Process
Clause.'33
The Culbertson court noted an earlier case, Adams v. Southern
Cal. First Nat'l Bank,"3 where the Ninth Circuit had allowed
private self-help repossession under the UCC, 35 but distinguished
it on three grounds. First, in Adams the innkeeper's lien statute was
an extension, rather than a mere codification, of the common
law. 36  Second, in the repossession context, the seized property,
the purchase creating the debt and the security interest are all
specifically related. In the distress setting of Culbertson, however,
a general debt was satisfied by "indiscriminate seizure of property
as collateral."'37 Finally, in Culbertson, the distress was authorized
130. Id. at 353. When stating that the statute at issue did not compel distress,
the court noted that other means were also provided by the state to resolve
financial disputes between the parties, such as ejectment, assumpsit, replevin, and
confession of judgment. Id. at 353 n.13.
131. Id. at 354.
132. 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision with concurrence).
133. Id. at 432.
134. 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
135. Culbertson, 528 F.2d at 428 (stating Adams' holding to be that UCC self-
help repossession not action "under color" of state law).
136. Id. at 429. Contra Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 162-63 (1978)
(improper to base validity of statute on origin of law, as result would be "consti-
tutional condemnation in one State of a remedy found perfectly permissible in
another").
137. Culbertson, 528 F.2d at 431.
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by statute and was not supported by a private contractual agreement
collateralizing the lessee's property,"'8 as it had been in Adams.
In Melara v. Kennedy,139 decided between Culbertson and
Flagg, the Ninth Circuit considered a proposed warehouseman's sale
under the UCC. A unanimous court concluded that state action was
not present and listed several factors relevant to the determination,
including (1) the source of authority; (2) the pervasiveness of
regulation; (3) the relationship between the property and underlying
debt; (4) the existence of a contractual provision for the challenged
activity; (5) the presence of joint participation by the state; and (6)
the occurrence of a delegation of a traditional state function."4
The Melara court also criticized Culbertson, stating "there was
very little agreement ... absent the result"'4 and "each judge
[was] writing independently [with] no opinion representing a majori-
ty."' 42  The court also distinguished Hall v. Garson,'4' the Fifth
Circuit opinion which held that a Texas distraint statute constituted
state action,"4 noting that two conditions present in Melara were
lacking in Hall: (1) a specific relation between the debt and
property and (2) a contractual provision providing notice of the
potential seizure. 45
It remains unclear how the Ninth Circuit will rule on the issue
in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Flagg Bros. and
Lugar.'" Private seizures would likely be found constitutional, as
nonregulated action which does not significantly involve the state.
A subsequent sale without judicial proceedings, however, would
unconstitutionally transfer ownership with state approval. Such a
result seems consonant both with the Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments and the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Melara.
Distress is traditionally a private self-help remedy. Without a
state's joint participation or pervasive regulation, the actual seizure
138. L at 432.
139. 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
140. Id. at 805 (noting that all of these factors should be considered; no specific
formula controlled).
141. Id. at 806 n.7.
142. Id. at 804.
143. Id. at 807.
144. See supra text accompanying note 113.
145. Melara, 541 F.2d at 808.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 98-112.
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should be upheld in spite of the weak relation between the property
and debt, and the absence of a contractual provision. Because a
subsequent sale of the property would require further state
involvement in order to convey clear title, it seems unlikely that
courts would uphold such an action. No federal appellate court has
sanctioned this type of sale absent a contractual relationship.
V. DISTRESS AS A VALID LEGAL CONCEPT IN ALASKA
Assuming that some form of distress would pass constitutional
muster, the current status of the remedy in Alaska remains
uncertain. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to rule
directly on distraint, 47 the Alaska legislature has adopted the
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, which abolishes
distraint for residential leases." s Whether some distress remedy
still exists in the commercial lease setting, however, is an open
question.
A. Common Law Distraint Acknowledged by Bickel
Prior to statehood, an Alaska district court recognized the
common law remedy of distress in Bickel v. Polaris Investment
Co.149 In Bickel, a bankruptcy trustee attempted to set aside, as
a voidable preference, the distraint of a tenant's office property that
occurred within four months of the tenant's bankruptcy.' The
court concluded that, although Alaska had no statutory landlord's
lien nor specific provisions for distress warrant proceedings, the
common law right to distress could be exercised.' The decision
was based upon a statute declaring the law of the Alaskan Territory
147. See Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 126 n.16 (Alaska 1991)
(On remand, the trial court may consider whether the landlord has "claim to [a]
lien or to the remedy of distraint which justifies its possession" of the tenant's
property.).
148. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250(b) (1990) ("Distraint for rent is abolished.");
UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr 7B U.L.A. 427 (1985).
149. 155 F. Supp. 411 (D. Alaska 1957).
150. Id. at 412. The bankruptcy code in effect at the time allowed the trustee
to avoid any transfer of the debtor's property within 4 months of bankruptcy if the
transfer placed a creditor in a better position than usual under the bankruptcy
provisions. See id. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1989) (current preference provision
allows trustee to avoid transfer if within 90 days of filing bankruptcy).
151. Bickel, 155 F. Supp. at 413-14.
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to be "so much of the common law as is applicable and not inconsis-
tent with the Constitution of the United States or with any law
passed by Congress or the Legislature of Alaska."152  Bickel
concluded that "[t]he right of distress by actual seizure of possession
of the tenant's property upon demised premises must therefore be
recognized.' ' 3
Two years after Bickel was decided, Alaska became the forty-
ninth state. One of the constitutional provisions adopted as part of
the statehood proceedings states that "[a]ll laws in force in the
Territory of Alaska on the effective date of this constitution and
consistent therewith shall continue in force until they expire by their
own limitation, are amended, or repealed."'54 Because Bickel has
yet to be overruled, it would appear that distress still remains a valid
remedy in Alaska.
B. Adoption of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act
In 1974, Alaska adopted the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act ("URLTA")... which, in relevant part, states that
"[d]istraint for rent is abolished."'56 Alaska adopted this clause
verbatim from the model URLTA,5 7 and the comments to the
Model Act clearly state that the Act "does not apply to rental
agreements made for commercial [purposes] or any purpose other
than residential."'58 Despite the Act's limited residential scope,
152. Id. at 413.
153. Id. at 414; accord City Bldg. Corp. v. Farish, 292 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1961)
(common law distress still exists where not eliminated by statute).
154. ALASKA CONsT. art. XV, § 1.
155. Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1972 ch. 10, § 1-6
(codified at ALASKA STAT. 88 34.03.010-.380 (1990)). Although this statute did not
adopt the entire URLTA verbatim, the URLTA characterizes the Alaska Act as
a "substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Uniform Act." UNto.
RESIDENTiAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr 7B U.L.A. 427, 427 (1985).
156. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.250(b) (1990).
157. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr § 4.205(b), 7B U.L.A.
427, 497 (1985).
158. Id. § 1.101 cmt., 7B U.L.A. 427, 433 (1985). It is conceivable that the
Alaska legislature, in adopting the URLTA, did not intend to adopt the comments
to the URLTA. However, the Alaska Supreme Court has used other non-enacted
comments to construe the intent of other Alaska statutes. See, e.g., McCall v.
Fickes, 556 P.2d 535, 537 n.3, 538 n.6 (Alaska 1976) (using Model Act comments
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the Second Restatement of Property interprets the no distraint
clause as abolishing distraint in residential and commercial leas-
es.
159
The language of the Alaska URLTA, however, does not
support such a broad interpretation. The stated purpose is to
"revise the law governing the rental of dwelling units... [and to]
improve the quality of housing."'" The phrase "dwelling unit," as
defined by the Act, "means a structure or a part of a structure that
[is] issued as a home, residence, or sleeping place by one person
who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain
a common household."'' 1 Similarly, the section of the Act which
abolishes distraint states that a lien "on behalf of the landlord on
the tenant's household goods is not enforceable."' 6 A tenant is
defined by the Act as "a person entitled under a rental agreement
to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others."'" It is
clearly inappropriate to extract from such focused language the
broad interpretation offered by the Second Restatement of
Property."6 Distraint, therefore, should continue to remain a valid
and viable remedy for breach of a commercial lease."
to support the holding that the URLTA merely added to, but did not overrule, a
prior forcible entry and detainer statute).
159. See supra note 5 (assertion that view is incorrect). At least one other
author appears to have followed the Restatement's viewpoint. See Brandon, supra
note 3, at 941 n.616. This seems to be merely an oversight, as both sources cite
other state statutes which interpret the Uniform Act to abolish distraint for
"residential leases" only. Id
160. ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010(b)(1)-(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
161. 1& § 34.03.360(3) (Supp. 1992).
162. Id. § 34.03.250(a) (1990).
163. I. § 34.03.360(16) (Supp. 1992).
164. Cf Watson v. Brown, 686 P.2d 12, 15 (Haw. 1984) (adoption of URLTA
is "merely cumulative and does not abolish an existing common law remedy" thus
leaving distraint "mainly applicable to commercial leases").
165. See UNiF. RESIDENTLAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr § 1.103, 7B U.L.A.
427, 435 (1985) (Unless specifically "displaced by the provisions of this Act,"
existing law is not intended to be modified.); see also Mason v. Schumacher, 439
N.W.2d 61, 67 (Neb. 1989) ("URLTA does not exclude or otherwise alter common
law, unless the common law is expressly displaced."). But cf. Schaible v. Fairbanks
Medical & Surgical Clinic, Inc., 531 P.2d 1252,1260 n.31 (Alaska 1975) ("While [the
URLTA] does not control the case at bar, the proviso reflects a legislative mandate
for using the forcible entry and detainer procedure to evict tenants.").
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Finding that commercial distraint survives Alaska's version of
the URLTA does not end the inquiry, however, because it remains
to be seen how Alaska courts will treat distraint. Several other
jurisdictions have characterized distress as a "harsh and oppressive"
doctrine based upon antiquated common law concepts that have no
place in today's society."6 A federal bankruptcy court has sug-
gested that "[t]he absence of any decision on the point [by the
Vermont Supreme Court] could very well [mean] that the doctrine
is not recognized in this state."167 Although the Alaska Supreme
Court has acknowledged the existence of distraint,"6 it has offered
no guidance on how distraint should be treated after Alaska's
adoption of the URLTA.
C. Commercial/Residential Tenant Distinctions
Ample basis exists to distinguish commercial leases from their
residential counterparts. The trend toward tenant protection is
based on an increasing desire to protect consumers and prevent the
harsh overreaching of landlords.'69 In a commercial context,
however, the relative bargaining power of the parties and the
interests to be protected are significantly different than in a
residential context. The United States Supreme Court recognized
this distinction in D.H. Overmyer Co. of Oris v. Frick Co.,70
166. See In re King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453, 456 (E.D. Ark. 1965)
(Arkansas would not recognize "harsh and oppressive" remedy.); accord Davis v.
Odell, 729 P.2d 1117, 1121 (Kan. 1986) (legislature adopted URLTA recognizing
"antiquated common-law concepts and the absence of statutory law created
problems"). See also Pawco, Inc. v. Bergman Knitting Mills, Inc., 424 A.2d 891, 894
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("'Too often courts have relied on outdated common law
property principals' and fail to reach conclusions just and equitable to the tenant.
(quoting Albert R Greenfield & Co. v. Kolea, 380 A.2d 758,760 (Pa. 1977))); supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
167. In re M.A.P.P., Inc., 26 B.R. 391, 392 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).
168. See Klosterman v. Nickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 126 n.16 (Alaska 1991)
(On remand, the trial court may consider whether the landlord has "claim to lien
or to the remedy of distraint which justifies its possession" of the tenant's proper-
ty.).
169. See McCall v. Fickes, 556 P.2d 535, 537-38 n.3 (Alaska 1976) ("Existing
landlord-tenant law.., is a product of English common law developed" at a time
when doctrines inappropriate to modem urban conditions were applied. These
doctrines are "inexpressive of the vital interests of the parties and the public which
the law must protect.").
170. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
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where it upheld a cognovit, or confession of judgment provision, in
a commercial contract.' A cognovit is an ancient legal device
that allows a creditor to obtain a judgment without notice, hearing,
and possibly with the appearance of a creditor-assigned attorney on
behalf of the debtor.' Several states disallow this type of provi-
sion; some even make its use a misdemeanor. 3 One court
described the cognovit as "'the loosest way of binding a man's
property that ever was devised in any civilized country." 174  In
spite of this strong general disapproval and the fact that most states
prohibit a cognovit in small loans and consumer sales, the Supreme
Court upheld the provision. 5
The Court supported its holding by reiterating that the
defendant was a corporation that had been a party to "tens of
thousands of contracts."'7 6 According to the Court, because the
parties were of equal bargaining power, this was not a contract of
adhesion nor a case of "overreaching."' Based on these narrow
facts, the Court upheld a provision that would be repugnant in the
consumer context. 7 8
Courts have also distinguished between commercial and
residential leases in other legal contexts.'79 For instance, some
jurisdictions make the implied warranty of habitability available to
residential, but not commercial, tenants."°  Others have relied
171. Id. at 187-88. Overmyer was cited in Fuentes v. Shevin as describing condi-
tions upon which the Court would allow a contractual waiver of due process rights.
In that consumer case, however, the requirements were not met. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-95 (1972).
172. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 176.
173. Id at 177-78.
174. Id. at 177 (quoting Alderman v. Diament, 7 NJ.L. 197, 198 (1824)).
175. Id. at 187.
176. Id at 186.
177. Id.
178. See id at 187-88.
179. See, e.g., In re Great Basin Holding Corp., 9 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1981) ("The equitable factors which may have warranted the Nevada Legislature
in abolishing distraint in residential settings are thus lost where, as here, the parties
are business entities of approximately equal bargaining ability and strength.").
180. See e.g., Spialter v. Testa, 392 A.2d 1265, 1268 (NJ. Morris County Dist.
Ct. 1978), affd, 408 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412
A.2d 806 (NJ. 1980).
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upon assumed bargaining equality to allow distraint in commercial
leases, while prohibiting the remedy in a residential context. 1
D. Alaska Case Law
The Alaska Supreme Court recently implied that distraint
remains a valid remedy in the commercial context. In Klosterman
v. Hickel Investment Co., ~ the court held that lease provisions did
not permit the landlord to assert ownership of the defaulting
tenant's property.183 However, the Alaska Supreme Court re-
manded the case for a determination of the tenant's damages and
instructed the trial court that, among other issues, it could consider
whether the remedy of distraint justified the landlord's actions.'
Although the Klosterman decision provides little guidance for
distraint procedure, the court did recognize the remedy's existence.
Prior to Klosterman, it appeared that the Alaska Supreme
Court had eliminated landlord self-help in general in the case of
Klinger v. Peterson." Klinger held that, absent a special provision
in a lease, "a leasehold interest in land can be terminated prema-
turely only by judicial decree in a statutory action."' As support,
Klinger relied upon the language of Alaska Statutes section
09.45.690: "'Unless otherwise provided in the lease, a landlord has
a right to re-enter leased premises when a tenant fails to pay rent,
and may bring action to recover possession."" The Klinger court
interpreted the phrase "may bring action" to require a judicial
decree." This interpretation was followed in later cases. 8 9
Klinger did not directly address distraint, however, and its holding
181. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 statutory note
5 (1977) (listing nine jurisdictions which distinguish between residential and
commercial leases in their distress laws).
182. 821 P.2d 118 (Alaska 1991).
183. 1& at 125.
184. Id. at 126 n.16.
185. 486 P.2d 373 (Alaska 1971).
186. Id. at 378.
187. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.690).
188. See id.
189. See, e.g., Dillingham Commercial Co. v. Spears, 641 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1982)
(leasehold interest commonly may be terminated by judicial decree); Murray v.
Feight, 741 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Alaska 1987) (noted that lower court had invalidated
distraint based upon re-entry).
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that a landlord cannot terminate a lease through self-help appears
to have been abandoned in Klosterman."9
E. Oregon's Interpretation: A Potential Guidepost for Alaska
Since the Alaska Supreme Court has not affirmatively decided
whether distraint exists after the legislature's adoption of URLTA,
a look at Oregon's case law may be helpful given the similarity
between Oregon statutes and those of Alaska. In Smith v. Chip-
man,'9' the Oregon Supreme Court expressly held that the com-
mon law distress remedy survived the reform of residential landlord-
tenant laws."9  Chipman relied upon an early territorial statute
and a provision of Oregon's constitution that is very similar to
Alaska's which incorporated English common law as state law.' 93
The court distinguished common law "self-help" distress from the
statutory attachment remedy, and held that the two were cumulative
rather than inconsistent." Chipman further relied upon the
legislative enactment of an innkeeper's lien, the inclusion of distress
in the Restatement of Security, and the fact most jurisdictions have
some type of distress remedy, to reach the conclusion that distraint
"is not foreign to[,] but consonant with today's sense of justice."' 95
Chipman's reasoning should be persuasive to the Alaska
Supreme Court given the present character of Alaska property law.
Alaska's forcible entry and detainer statute was borrowed from
Oregon."9 Furthermore, like Oregon, Alaska enacted a statutory
innkeeper's lien, which applies even to personal property not owned
by the guest unless the hotel operator has actual notice of that
guest's non-ownership."9 Alaska also has enacted the standard
provision in its Uniform Commercial Code that "[t]his chapter does
190. See Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 122 (Alaska 1991) ("Al-
though the statute [A.S. 09.45.690] refers to a landlord's right to initiate judicial
action, it clearly does not make such action mandatory.").
191. 348 P.2d 441 (Or. 1960).
192. 1& at 444; see also In re Sabre Farms, Inc., 27 B.R. 532, 536-37 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1982) (recognizing common law distress distinct from statutory landlord lien in
commercial lease after adoption of URLTA).
193. See Chipman, 348 P.2d at 443-44.
194. ML at 445.
195. Id. at 446-47.
196. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.45.060 note at 177 (1983) (citing Steil v. Dessmore,
3 Alaska 392 (1907)).
197. See id § 34.35.510 (1990).
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not apply ... to a landlord's lien," which clearly assumes the
existence of some type of landlord lien.198 Finally, chapter 27 of
Alaska's property statutes, entitled "Modification or Abolition of
Common Law Property Rules," does not prohibit distraint, a signal
that the legislature intended to retain it.'19 The Alaska Supreme
Court could decide to maintain the common law distraint remedy,
in accordance with the legislature's public policy determinations
evident in the innkeeper's lien statute, until such time as the
legislature sees fit to change the status quo. As the Seventh Circuit
stated when upholding Illinois' statutory distraint law, distraint
remedies "are subject to the operation of normal political forc-
es.
,9)2 00
VI. DISTRESS PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN ALASKA
Determining that distress exists in Alaska reveals little about
what form and procedures would meet court approval. Most states
have some law governing the manner in which the landlord may
proceed, and the validity of the distress remedy itself may hinge on
the procedures utilized.2 ' Alaska does not have a provision
covering distress in either its statutory property lien chapter' or
its provisional remedy chapter.' An examination of the proce-
dures found in analogous Alaska statutes, however, sheds some light
on what might constitute the proper procedures for distress. This
section will also identify some pitfalls landlords may encounter while
drafting distraint provisions.
198. Id. § 45.09.104(2) (1986).
199. See id. §§ 34.27.010-.030 (1990) (abolishing rule in Shelley's case and
destructibility of contingent remainders, modifying rule against perpetuities).
200. Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150, 156 (7th Cir. 1975),
cerL denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
201. Compare Van Ness Indus., Inc. v. Claremont Painting & Decorating Co.,
324 A.2d 102, 106 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) ("[S]ince the common law
substantive right of distraint is governed by invalid procedural methods it may not
be exercised in New Jersey.") with USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung v.
Cousins Club, Inc., 348 N.E.2d 831, 835 (MI1. 1976) ("If our [distress statute was] to
be adjudged unconstitutional, the landlord might claim his common law remedy and
seek to proceed against the tenant unhindered by the restrictions of the statutes.").
202. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 34.34.005-.930 (1990).
203. See id. §§ 09.40.10-.110 (1983).
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A. Analogous Alaska Procedural Statutes
The first procedural question to be addressed is whether Alaska
law will permit a distraint sale. Alaska has a statutory provision
authorizing and circumscribing procedures for enforcing a chattel
improvement mortgage. This statute even permits a private sale
provided proper notice has been given.' It is unlikely, however,
that a landlord will succeed in analogizing his situation to that of a
chattel lienholder. The common law of distraint prohibits landlords
from selling distrained property.'5 Until the Alaska legislature
formally adopts a distraint provision, the Alaska courts will likely
defer to the common law position. Furthermore, distraint sales have
been held to constitute state action and therefore raise constitutional
problems not present in the chattel lienholder context.2 6 Given
these difficulties, it is unlikely that Alaska courts will allow landlords
to sell distrained property.
A procedure prohibiting self-help which leads to violence is far
more likely to find approval in the Alaska courts. An aversion to
violent re-entry is found in Alaska's forcible entry and detainer
statute.27 This same restriction existed at early common law and
modem courts will surely continue to condemn any self-help which
leads to violence. A landlord can, however, include a re-entry
provision in the lease to avoid possible difficulties under Kling-
er.' Finally, the Alaska courts will likely construe the Alaska
Exemptions Actm to limit the type of property subject to dis-
204. Id. §§ 34.35.175(b)-(d) (1990)
205. See supra text accompanying note 37 (power of sale did not exist at
common law); but see In re Great Basin Holding Corp., 9 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1981) (noting that English distress statutes may become part of common law).
206. Federal circuit courts have yet to sanction a distraint sale. See supra text
accompanying notes 113-145.
207. ALASkA STAT. § 09.45.060 (1983); see also Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co.,
821 P.2d 118, 122 n.5 (Alaska 1991) (""[A]ny self-help action must [occur] ... in
a peaceable manner and without a breach of the peace.").
208. See supra notes 185-190 and accompanying text for a discussion of possible
problems in re-entering a leasehold without a judicial decree or specific lease
provision; see also Murray v. Feight, 741 P.2d 1148,1152 (Alaska 1987) (noting that
trial court had disallowed distraint because no re-entry provision in lease or judicial
decree).
209. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.38.010-.510 (1983).
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traint.21 ° Although most commercial property would still be
subject to distraint, the Act seems to demonstrate a public policy to
protect exempted property against seizure.
B. Implied Waiver of Common Law Distress by Lien Provision
in the Lease
Landlords should be cautioned about including overly broad
distress provisions in commercial leases, as these may be construed
to waive common law rights in favor of a contractual lien. Strictly
speaking, the common law distress remedy requires no lease
provision at all. However, inclusion of distress language in the lease
may be a factor courts consider when weighing state property
deprivation issues. A lease provision would place the tenant on
notice and provide the contractual link between distrained property
and the underlying debt which the Ninth Circuit considered
important in Culbertson and Melara." Any distress clause should,
however, be explicitly cumulative and in no way limit common law
remedies.2 12
Another problematic item for landlords is that the common law
allows distress only during the landlord-tenant relationship.213
Therefore, any distraint must occur before the landlord terminates
the lease.214 Once this distraint occurs, the validity of acceleration
clauses, distraint for utility expenses, and distraint priority must be
210. See In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167, 173 (1. 1984) (applying
exemption statute to limit distress).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 132-145 (Ninth Circuit considers factor
of contractual provision notifying debtor of creditor remedies).
212. For examples of such distress clauses, see Dillingham Commercial Co. v.
Spears, 641 P.2d 1, 4 (Alaska 1982) (lease provision reserving rights to distraint);
In re King Furniture City, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 453, 454 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (provision
waived exemption laws and made cumulative to statutory lien). Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 12.1 cmt. j (lease may expand or contract
landlord's remedies).
213. See supra text accompanying note 17. Although the English Statute of 8
Anne, ch. 14, extended the right to distrain for six months beyond the lease
termination date, this extension has not been adopted by all states. See supra text
accompanying note 18.
214. Cf Klosterman v. Hickel Inv. Co., 821 P.2d 118, 124 (Alaska 1991) (while
lessor's re-entry is not necessarily acceptance of tenant's offer to terminate, if lessor
does accept, rent obligations cease).
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considered. However, these issues remain to be settled by the
courts or legislature.
VII. CONCLUSION
While the status of the distress remedy remains uncertain in
Alaska, there are precautions that all parties may take to improve
their legal positions. Any party may insist upon "ideal" lease
provisions, but may then be unable to find a party willing to
concede to these demands. The ideal conditions should be
considered, however, in order to ascertain what possible rights and
remedies may not be available in a given lease.
A. Landlord-Tenant Bargaining
From the landlord's point of view, the lease should provide for
a contractual lien that is expressly cumulative to common law rights
of distraint. The agreement should then be filed as a blanket UCC
financing statement to afford additional protection. The lease also
should contain an explicit right to re-enter upon default without
terminating the rental obligations of the tenant. If the landlord is
paying utilities, they should be charged as part of rental payments,
rather than as "rent plus utilities." Any acceleration clause should
also be phrased to explicitly obligate the tenant to one lump-sum
rent total, with periodic payments towards this amount. These
precautions will not guarantee success in court, but will place the
landlord in the best possible position.
A prudent tenant, on the other hand, will seek an express lease
provision waiving distress. Security deposits will adequately protect
the landlord, and the distress waiver enables the tenant to obtain
necessary operating loans. Many wary creditors will demand such
waivers and may even include conditions requiring notice and
further waivers if the debtor changes location or landlords.
Under the theory of "equal bargaining power," the landlord and
tenant will then compromise at some midpoint. The problem with
this theory is that outside interests, such as creditors unaware of the
lease arrangement, are not represented at the bargaining table.
These individuals may then be defeated by the landlord's "super-
priority." It is fundamentally unfair to allow a landlord to sever
property from its owners, or the party who bargained for its use as
collateral, simply because the tenant happened to have possession
of the property when the landlord initiated distress.
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B. Proposal of Fairness to Creditors
This article proposes that Alaska maintain the distress remedy
in the commercial context and provides suggestions to the legislature
to ensure that the remedy is fairly applied. The majority of
jurisdictions recognize some type of distress remedy, and it
intuitively seems proper to keep any such peaceably settled matters
outside the court system. The common law distress remedy has
been criticized, however, precisely because of the "super-priority" it
affords landlords, providing them with "uniquely monopolistic
bargaining power" over tenants, who may also be precluded from
securing credit through other sources.215
The Alaska Legislature recognized the harsh consequences of
this absolutist feudal concept in the residential context and statu-
torily abolished it. Yet it makes sense to continue the use of
distraint in the commercial context where the bargaining factors are
much different. Because commercial entities are on a relatively
equal footing with their landlords, they can strike a fair bargain and
hence do not need the same protection as consumers.
Other creditors of the tenant have not bargained with the
landlord and their rights should not be subordinated to distress liens.
If landlords are permitted to distrain based upon a theory of equal
bargaining power, let them negotiate with creditors for priority.
Leases can include lien provisions and be filed along with any other
consensual UCC security interest.
This proposal puts creditors on notice of the landlord's lien and
allows them to bargain for subordination before granting credit. A
landlord would still be able to contract himself into a preferred lien
but would not receive a windfall beyond the tenant's security
deposit simply because other creditors were unaware of a lease
arrangement. Landlords could continue to distrain against commer-
cial tenants absent a lease-provided security interest, but such
distraint would be limited to the value of the tenant's equity in the
property. This proposal is equitable for all parties, as the tenant
represents the only entity who has agreed to the lease obligations.
215. See Self-Help, supra note 3, at 943.
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